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PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN 




Policies to promote privatisation in developing-country infrastructure gained momentum in 
the early 1990s as donors grew increasingly frustrated with efforts to strengthen public sector 
services that continued to fail. The strategy was intended to bring both finance and efficiency 
to ailing infrastructure throughout the developing world. Nearly two decades later the results 
have been disappointing, particularly in the areas of greatest need. The extent of investor 
interest in water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was massively overestimated and 
the hoped-for private investment failed to materialise. Rates of access to electricity and water 
remain far below those of other developing regions. In response to the failings of privatisation 
there has been a redoubling of efforts to attract investors, albeit with the recognition that this 
might take longer than originally thought. Privatisation in various guises is still prominent on 
the policy agenda. 
This paper critically assesses the motives behind the drive for private sector participation 
(PSP) in water and electricity in SSA, and reviews measures adopted by governments and donors 
to entice investors. In terms of restructuring and pricing, sector policies have the underlying 
objective of facilitating private investment and reducing the risk exposure for potential investors. 
In addition, a plethora of donor initiatives have emerged with the aim of bringing private 
investment into the region, and these too focus on reducing risk for the private sector. As a 
result, on offer to the private sector are the least challenging and most lucrative aspects of 
delivery, which are tightly ring-fenced and bound by guarantees. In industrialised economies, 
discussions of the merits of PSP highlight the importance of transferring risk to the private sector 
in order to generate efficiency gains. In contrast, as regards attracting PSP into utilities in SSA, the 
focus is on reducing the risk to which the private sector is exposed. But this risk is not reduced, it 
is transferred. As a result, African governments, taxpayers and end-users bear high levels of risk in 
order to accommodate the priorities of investors.  
1  INTRODUCTION 
Lives and livelihoods are suffering from the fragile state of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). The lack of transport, power, communication networks, water, sanitation and other 
infrastructure puts severe constraints on economic growth and poverty reduction across the 
region. Table 1 shows that SSA is behind the rest of the developing world in access to water 
and sanitation, as well as electricity. Progress on raising access rates has lagged other 
developing countries.  
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TABLE 1 
Water and Electricity Access Rates 



















  1990 2004 1990  2004  2004  2005  2005 
SSA 32  37  48  55 478  26 547 
All DCs
1 33  49  71  79  1221  68  1569 
OECD 94  96  97  99  8795  100  - 
World 49  59  78  83  2701  76  1577 
Note: 1. DCs = developing countries. 
Sources: Human Development Report 2007 data (www.hdrstats.undp.org); International Energy Agency (2006). 
 
The impact of these shortages is devastating. Lack of electricity is a major deterrent to 
economic development. The entire generating capacity of the 48 countries of SSA, at 63 
gigawatts, is comparable to that of Spain. Thirty-five countries in Africa are now experiencing a 
power crisis, and the supply is regularly interrupted. Only one in four Africans has access to 
electricity, and in rural areas the figure is below one in ten (MDG Africa Steering Group, 2008). 
In some countries, such as Burkina Faso, Malawi and Mozambique, access rates are as low as 7 
per cent (International Energy Agency, 2006). Electricity consumption is a fraction of that in 
other regions. Not only are access rates low, but the electricity supply is costly and unreliable. 
In an extensive survey of enterprises in the region, almost 60 per cent indicated that lack 
of electricity is their leading constraint (Africa Progress Panel, 2008). Unreliable electricity 
supply adds to the cost of manufacturing, and outages are reported an average of 56 days a 
year. The cost of this for firms is about 5–6 per cent of revenues. Many have their own 
expensive diesel generators. In the informal sector, where firms do not have back-up for power 
outages, the resulting loss in revenues can be as high as 20 per cent. A number of countries 
have brought in high-cost, short-term, emergency private power generators to deal with the 
current crisis (IMF, 2008a). 
More than 42 per cent of all Africans, some 300 million people, lack access to an improved 
water supply, and 64 per cent (477 million) lack access to adequate sanitation. Aside from the 
extensive human cost incurred by lack of access to water and sanitation, the economic costs in 
terms of health spending, productivity losses and labour diversions are also high, and are 
highest in the poorest countries. Research for the 2006 Human Development Report puts this 
economic cost at around 5 per cent of GDP or about US$ 28.4 billion a year, a figure higher 
than total aid flows and debt relief to the region in 2003 (UNDP, 2006).  
Table 2 shows how capital expenditure for infrastructure is financed in SSA. Overall, the 
public sector accounts for just under 48 per cent of such capital expenditure; official 
development assistance (ODA) accounts for a little more than 15 per cent. The table shows that 
the private sector contributes the highest proportion (more than 50 per cent) of infrastructure 
finance to information and communication technologies (ICT) and virtually nothing to the 
water sector. In the energy sector, finance for capital investment comes from the public sector 
(40 per cent), ODA (12 per cent), non-members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) (32 per cent), and the private sector (17 per cent). In water supply Working Paper  3 
 
 
and sanitation (WSS), 48 per cent of capital expenditure comes from the public sector, 38 per 
cent from ODA, and 14 per cent from non-OECD. The extent of private sector finance for capital 
expenditure in WSS is negligible. 
TABLE 2 
Capital Expenditure infrastructure spending in sub-Saharan Africa (US$ billion per year) 
Note: 1. PPI = private participation in infrastructure; 2. ICT = information and communication technologies. 
Source: Briceno-Garmendia et al. (2008), cited in Foster (2008). 
 
Public investment is largely financed by tax and carried out through central government 
budgets, while operation and maintenance are financed largely by user charges through state 
utilities (Foster, 2008). In the 1990s, there was a drive to increase the proportion of private 
sector finance for infrastructure with the launch of privatisation initiatives across the region, 
and the proportion of aid going to infrastructure declined. Figure 1 shows that donor support 
for water and electricity declined in the late 1990s but has since increased.  
FIGURE 1 










Source: OECD International Development Statistics. 
 
The reduction in donor funds was due in part to the anticipated inflow of private 
investment which failed to materialise. This overestimation of the private sector’s enthusiasm 
to invest in infrastructure was a major error on the part of donors and one with far-reaching 
consequences, as the current weakness of infrastructure, described above, demonstrates. 
Politicians, however, see it as a passing trend: 
 
 Capital  Expenditure 
  Public sector  % total  ODA  % total  Non-OECD  % total  PPI
1 %  total Total 
ICT
2 1.70  31.48  0.10  1.85  0.50  9.26  3.10  57.41  5.40 
Power 2.70  39.71  0.80  11.76  2.20  32.35  1.10  16.18  6.80 
Transport 5.50 62.50  1.70  19.32  1.10  12.50  0.50  5.68  8.80 
WSS 1.40  48.28  1.10  37.93  0.40  13.79  0.00  0.00  2.90 
Total 11.30  47.28  3.70  15.48  4.20  17.57  4.70  19.67  23.90 
Water supply and sanitation 
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“We went through a period in the Eighties and Nineties where it was rather fashionable  
to think the private sector will look after all investment in infrastructure, but it could  
not be more wrong.”  
Hilary Benn, then Secretary of State for International Development (UK) (HoC, 2006a: 23). 
 
The disappointing outcomes of privatisation initiatives in the 1990s have led, first, to an 
increase in donor support for infrastructure (as Figure 1 shows); and second, to a shift in the 
approach to (PSP).1 Privatisation is clearly more difficult than was anticipated, and hence 
donors and governments have stepped up their efforts to make infrastructure a more 
attractive and less risky investment prospect.  
This paper critically examines recent efforts to increase PSP in the delivery of water and 
electricity in SSA. It shows that governments and donors have made considerable efforts to 
attract investment into the water and electricity sectors in SSA. Sector restructuring and pricing 
have been directed by the underlying aim of accommodating the needs of potential investors, 
and this kind of institutional approach has been supported by loans from the World Bank. 
Donors have also developed other facilities to encourage investors by means of financial 
support and insurance against risk. The outcomes, however, have been disappointing.  
There has been very little investment in the water sector, and though donor support has  
been instrumental in leveraging some private sector finance in the electricity sector,  
this has only been on a significant scale when it has been tightly ring-fenced and secured.  
Facilities established by donors to encourage PSP in infrastructure can have a strong 
impact on firms’ investment decisions because an affiliation to a donor organisation can give 
an investor preference over other developing-country creditors. Hence PSP is not shaped by 
entrepreneurial dynamism and market-led responses but by donor policy. SSA is perceived as a 
risky destination for private funds. Countries are competing with other regions that are 
perceived as far less risky, and while such competition continues, attempts by donors and 
governments to manipulate the risk profile of investments will have little impact. 
In SSA the combination of weak state capacity, high levels of poverty and strong donor 
involvement has given a different slant to policy initiatives. In an industrialised context, the 
transfer of risk to the private sector is considered essential to derive efficiency gains from 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). In SSA, by contrast, weak investor interest has meant that 
policy efforts focus on reducing the risk exposure of the private sector, and thus risk may be 
borne by the state, taxpayers and end-users. Because policy has been and continues to be 
shaped by an emphasis on attracting the private sector, reform initiatives are framed by the 
needs of investors rather than domestic social and economic priorities. This paper shows that 
the drive for PSP may lead to the accumulation of public sector liabilities and sector 
fragmentation. Continuing to focus on the needs of investors distracts attention from the 
needs of the poor.  
The paper starts in the next section with an assessment of the main reasons for the drive 
for PSP in SSA, focusing on finance, efficiency and private sector development. Section 3 looks 
at the policies that have been adopted by developing-country governments and the specific 
facilities established by donors to attract private investment to infrastructure. Section 4 
considers the outcomes of such measures, while the final section draws some conclusions and 
considers alternative approaches.  Working Paper  5 
 
 
2  WHY ENCOURAGE PSP IN SSA? 
Disappointing results from privatisation initiatives in the 1990s, particularly in SSA and 
especially in water and sanitation and energy (see Bayliss and Fine, 2008), have led to a 
redoubling of efforts to encourage PSP. Appendix 1 lists some of the main initiatives that  
have emerged in connection with promoting the role of the private sector in infrastructure. 
This section critically analyses some of the key reasons why policymakers have gone to such 
lengths to promote PSP.  
2.1  FINANCE 
Huge amounts of finance are needed to get infrastructure in SSA on track. According to 
preliminary results from the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (see Appendix 1), annual 
investment needs in Africa’s infrastructure stand at about US$ 38 billion a year over the next  
10 years—equivalent to 5.3 per cent of GDP. Nearly two-thirds of investment needs are 
required for the energy sector (ICA, 2008). The MDG Africa Steering Group estimates that  
US$ 52.2 billion a year will be required in public and private investment to resolve the critical 
bottlenecks, and about half of this will have to go to the energy sector. To meet the additional 
costs, it was estimated in 2008 that ODA for infrastructure must at least double by 2010, but 
even this will not be enough. According to the 2008 progress evaluation, the shortfall from 
donors will have to be met by South-South cooperation, private philanthropy and PPPs  
(MDG Africa Steering Group, 2008). More recent figures from the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic put the figures even higher. They indicate that US$ 10 billion a year is required over 
the next 10 years in the water sector, and about US$ 42.6 billion in energy (Ouayoro, 2008).  
A number of donor reports have highlighted the role that the private sector can play in 
filling the “financing gap” (OECD, 2007). 
 
“In many countries such levels of investment cannot be financed by the public purse 
alone. To meet the needs, encouraging private investment in infrastructure is an option 
that governments cannot afford to ignore.”  
OECD, 2007: 9  
 
“The infrastructure requirements of poor countries grossly outweigh the investment 
capacity of governments and donors. Leveraging private investment and technical 
management 'know-how' can be critical to improving and expanding service provision.” 
DFID, 2005: 18  
 
“Governments in many developing countries invest far less than they need to in 
infrastructure, education, and health care, while private investors could do more to help 
fill the gap.”  
IFC Annual Report, 2008: 21 
 
“ICA members will continue to advocate at the highest levels in African governments  
for increased private sector participation … Individuals are willing to pay for quality 
infrastructure services. Ensuring self-financing solutions by setting fair tariffs and 
ensuring they are collected is crucial.”  
ICA, 2008: 5 
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“African governments must also make every effort to develop Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) to attract capital for the funding of infrastructure projects.”  
Africa Progress Panel, 2008: 13.  
 
This last quotation is from a report by the Africa Progress Panel, a group of high-ranking 
international leaders whose goal is to ensure the fulfilment of commitments to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The report later states that governments cannot 
expect PPPs to be a “magic bullet”. Governments must avoid corruption and ensure that tariffs, 
project terms and regulatory conditions are appropriate. According to the report, however, 
doing this is “as essential as it is complex”. 
The private sector can and does provide finance for infrastructure, but what the above 
quotations often neglect to mention is that money from the private sector has to be repaid  
by governments, users or donors. PPPs typically change the way in which the government  
(or users) pay for infrastructure but, while they may provide alternative financing mechanisms, 
private sector finance comes at a typically higher cost than that from the public sector. What is 
different about funding infrastructure through the private sector is the timing of payments,  
the accounting process and, usually, the cost.  
With public sector financing, the cost usually takes the form of a debt incurred by the 
government. With a PPP, the debt is incurred by the private sector but the government is 
meanwhile accruing liabilities. It might be true in some cases that the investment is paid  
for directly by the user, but in most cases the government has some kind of payment 
commitment. PPPs, then, allow governments to obtain infrastructure while deferring 
infrastructure spending, which can be an attractive option in a weak revenue position.  
PPPs can shift the financing off the government’s immediate budget, which reduces the 
apparent immediate fiscal cost of service delivery. PPPs can make the government's finances 
appear better than they are, thereby undervaluing the cost of PPP-financed infrastructure and 
biasing decisions towards PPP over more traditional procurement methods. Their extended 
use might be driven by a desire to avoid controls on expenditure and to transfer public debt 
from the government balance sheet (IMF, 2006: 2). 
PPPs will create future liabilities as the government’s capital outlay is replaced with a 
stream of fees payable over the years covered by the contract. The contract is effectively  
a redistribution of resources from the future to the present. PPPs carry costs from current to 
future generations (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). Potentially, PPPs can create substantial future 
liabilities and the future fiscal position will deteriorate further because the private sector will 
cherry-pick the most lucrative aspects of service delivery, leaving the state with the more 
challenging areas that have less scope for raising revenue. In Table 2 above, the finance  
that comes under the PPI heading for the power sector will be creating a future public  
sector liability , which will mostly have to be re-paid by the state and possibly at high cost. 
Furthermore, private sector finance in the power sector in SSA is heavily ring-fenced and 
supported by sovereign guarantees. This is discussed further in Section 4. 
In order to secure PPP contracts, governments offer guarantees to investors; where  
this is the case, the future financial liabilities can be extensive. Guarantees are common in PPP 
contracts where the government has a legal obligation to pay a known or unknown amount in 
the case of a specific event. For example, the government may guarantee a proportion of the Working Paper  7 
 
 
debt of the private partner, and may have to step in and pay if the private partner cannot  
do so. Alternatively, a government may guarantee a minimum revenue flow to a private firm. 
Often, government guarantees are not subject to the same amount of scrutiny as regular 
spending. They may give rise to contingent liabilities for governments, liabilities that may  
be payable in the future. The use of guarantees to secure private financing can expose the 
government to hidden and higher costs than traditional public finance (Akitoby et al., 2007). 
These financing mechanisms are particularly attractive to governments facing severe 
fiscal constraints, which are likely to be the most vulnerable. Research into the drivers for PPP 
contracts finds that the level of government indebtedness is a significant variable in achieving 
PPP in the water and sanitation sectors. Such research attributes this to the fact that the 
governments of more highly indebted countries find it more difficult to access credit and  
thus turn to project finance in order to offset declining government expenditure, though it 
may also be that those countries are under more pressure from donors to implement PPPs  
(Jensen and Blanc Brude, 2006). 
In evaluating the impact of a PPP, the question is: what would have happened otherwise? 
In developed countries, the provision of infrastructure via a PPP is arguably more expensive 
because government borrowing is generally cheaper than private sector finance. Hence  
the PPP, in order to be beneficial, must bring efficiency gains. The choices are not so 
straightforward in SSA because governments often have little fiscal space for investment in 
infrastructure and donors play a major role in infrastructure finance. It might be the case that 
without private sector finance the investment would not happen at all, but it might also  
be true that governments go to such lengths to attract private investors that they accept 
expensive future financial commitments. A cheaper option is to finance infrastructure with 
concessional funds from donors (Foster, 2008).  
2.2  EFFICIENCY 
Although they are more expensive than state provision, PPPs are supposed to provide value 
for money and lead to improved service delivery because the private sector is deemed to be 
more efficient. According to the OECD (2008a), even if the state is effective and does what is 
expected, it may not be efficient in that it may not be operating at least cost. Privatisation 
theory, based on a neoliberal framework of individual utility maximisation, explains why 
private firms are considered to be more efficient than state-owned enterprises (for theory  
and critique, see Fine, 2008 ). According to privatisation theory, higher efficiency levels are 
expected because the private sector has an incentive to produce the required outputs at 
lowest cost in order to maximise returns. For these benefits to reach beyond the firm itself, 
however, competition and risk transfer are required (see Section 4.3).  
In Europe, the PPP approach was pioneered by the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which  
was launched in 1992 in the United Kingdom. The PFI differed from earlier arrangements with 
the private sector in that, rather than the state being involved in the details of managing a 
project—such as the construction of a hospital—the private sector was given certain output-
based specifications and was then free to manage the project and provide appropriate inputs. 
The public sector was no longer involved in the minutiae of project implementation. As of 
December 2006, 794 PFI projects had been signed for a capital value of £ 55 billion. This growth 
in PPPs has been replicated across the world to different degrees (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). 8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
In developing countries, privatisation gained momentum in the 1990s as donors 
became increasingly frustrated with government projects and reforms that were not 
sustained. Efforts to improve efficiency in public enterprises through institutional reform 
without PSP proved difficult (DFID, 2002). PSP was expected to bring about improvements  
in performance that were not achievable or sustainable with policies that stopped short of 
private sector involvement.  
Despite the growth in PPPs, the evidence on performance remains mixed. On the one 
hand, PFI projects in the United Kingdom seem to be delivering cost savings compared to 
traditional procurement methods, and there have been improvements in completion time and 
cost of delivery. Reports from the British Treasury show that 76 per cent of PPP projects have 
been completed on time, compared to 30 per cent of traditionally procured projects. Other 
evidence, however, indicates that schools provided under PFI contracts were less satisfactory 
than those provided under traditional procurement methods (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). 
Another evaluation of PFI schools in the United Kingdom found no evidence that PFI schools 
were built quicker or had a difference in construction or most running costs (Audit 
Commission, 2003). 
There is some evidence from the United Kingdom to indicate that private project 
financiers can bring greater scrutiny in the project preparation stage. PFI has led to greater 
rigour in things like risk allocation in project design. Private financiers carry out due diligence 
and monitor project progress carefully. But the research also finds that debt financiers make 
little effort to resolve difficulties if a project is failing, and quickly cut their losses (PWC, 2008).  
Stepping back from PFI specifically, there is a wide body of empirical research into the 
impact of privatisation more generally. Mostly this relates to industrialised countries but there 
is some research into the impact in developing countries (for example, Shirley and Walsh, 2001; 
D’Souza et al., 2001). Generally, research finds in favour of privatisation and the private sector, 
and these findings are regularly cited in support of privatisation. For instance: 
 
“Empirical evidence from several sectors strongly suggests that service quality, 
productivity and profitability rise significantly following privatisation.”  
Galiani et al., 2005: 87  
 
Much of the empirical research, however, tends to group all developing countries under 
one heading and typically there are few cases from SSA. The little research conducted in SSA 
suggests that the generalised empirical findings do not fit quite so easily.  
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) look at the impact of privatisation in developing countries and 
include some African firms in their sample. They find that privatisation is more successful the 
higher a country’s income level. In their later study, Boubakri et al. (2001) find that, in contrast to 
evidence in industrialised countries, firms in Africa and the Middle East do not record a rise in 
profitability and efficiency but they do record an increase in investment on privatisation.  
The authors account for this as follows: 
 
“The success of privatization is further enhanced by an adequate institutional 
environment that insures the protection of property rights and law enforcement.  Working Paper  9 
 
 
In countries where legal protection is weak, performance gains can only be modest as 
illustrated by the privatization experience of African countries.”  
Boubakri et al., 2001: 32 
 
This suggests that efficiency gains from PSP in SSA are by no means guaranteed.  
Research into PSP in the region’s water sector also fails to find clear advantages of PSP. A study 
by Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2004) examines a total of 71 water utilities in Africa, of which 
eight were privately owned or managed. The authors conducted a data envelopment analysis to 
establish the relative efficiency of firms. Their findings suggest that “private ownership leads to 
higher efficiency scores but also that many state-owned water firms in Africa seem to perform 
relatively efficiently” (p. 13). They also carried out a stochastic cost frontier, from which they 
conclude “overall the safest interpretation of the cost frontier result is that there are no 
significant differences in cost efficiency between private and state-owned water companies in 
Africa” (p. 16). A study by Estache and Kouassi (2002) which also looked at African water utilities 
does find that private sector utilities are associated with higher levels of efficiency, but that 
overall governance and institutional issues are just as important in determining performance.  
A recent study by Gassner et al. (2009) concludes that PSP is associated with performance 
improvements in the distribution of water and electricity in developing countries. This is a large 
cross-country study using a dataset of more than 1,200 utilities in 71 developing and transition 
economies. The study includes 977 water utilities and 250 utilities from the electricity sector.  
Of these enterprises, 926 are state-owned and 301 have had some kind of PSP. The sample, 
however, is dominated by Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia. Only 11  
per cent of the electricity utilities and 3 per cent of the sample of water utilities are from SSA. In 
the context of the above discussion it is unclear that the results will be relevant to SSA. The study 
is highly data-intensive and it is not plain why the findings might have occurred. Moreover, there 
is another limitation to this kind of empirical research comparing private with public utilities.  
One of the difficulties with such research is that there is a potential bias: the better performing 
state utilities are more likely to be privatised because they are more attractive to investors.  
Thus, even if private enterprises performed better than public enterprises, it cannot be inferred 
that this is the result of privatisation 
In contrast, a US study into public and private water utilities in the American Midwest finds 
no clear evidence to support the claim that private or public ownership is inherently more 
economically efficient (Wolff and Halstein, 2005). The authors conclude that every community 
and private organisation has a unique set of values, experiences and assets. What works for one 
community or company might not work for another. They find six causes of underperformance: 
inefficient staffing, insufficient investment, poor asset management, ineffective performance 
measurement and reward, limited transparency and participation, and reform processes that 
make a false start by storming in with solutions without first understanding the problems.  
These factors, say the authors, are far more important than ownership.  
There is, then, no clear empirical evidence that privatisation brings about improvements in 
efficiency in the delivery of water and electricity, and the empirical evidence is particularly weak 
in SSA. Many water and electricity utilities in the region operate at low levels of efficiency, and 
improvements in performance could generate substantial financial savings and go some 
considerable distance to reducing the financing gap. Privatisation policies, however, do not 
necessarily achieve efficiency improvements, and the utilities that have the greatest need for 10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
improvements are those in which private firms are least interested. Some utilities in SSA are  
more efficient than others. These differences cannot be attributed to PSP but relate to the  
wider context. The problems of poor institutions and weak governance that are common in 
many utilities are national issues that will not necessarily be resolved at the sector level (Estache 
and Kouassi, 2002). The performance difference between all enterprises in one country relative  
to another is arguably more important that the impact of different degrees of PSP within 
countries (Bayliss and Fine, 2008). 
2.3  PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
Infrastructure has come to occupy a strange place in development policy, inasmuch as  
it is a requirement for private sector development (PSD) while the nascent private sector is 
encouraged to actually provide the infrastructure that is also supposed to stimulate PSD.  
For the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), for example, 
 
“Not only are infrastructure services essential for private enterprises to function and 
flourish and improve livelihoods but there is also considerable scope for the involvement 
of the private sector in the delivery of such services.”  
DFID, 2005: 18 
 
This is an ambiguous and confusing position. The state of a nation's infrastructure is both 
a determinant of PSD and a means by which PSD policies can be implemented—by inducing 
the private sector to invest in infrastructure, the absence of which would normally be 
considered a deterrent to investment. The private sector is deterred from investing where 
there is weak infrastructure, yet the PSD approach attempts to persuade it to do so.  
Policy outcomes can be contradictory. Policies to attract investors may not sit comfortably 
with policies to develop infrastructure. For example, taxation can be used to raise finance for 
infrastructure, yet many countries reduce their tax rates to very low levels because of the 
perceived need to attract foreign direct investment (HoC, 2006a). Similarly, what might be 
beneficial in terms of infrastructure may not be good for PSD. For example, it might be cheaper 
to employ a large contractor to provide a water treatment plant, but this then works against 
the interests of small firms and the domestic private sector, and it is not clear which approach 
should take precedence. 
Another way in which PSD and infrastructure are confused relates to small-scale local 
providers in public service delivery. The domestic private sector is widely used in the delivery 
of water to those without piped connections, for example through the use of tanker trucks. 
Private water sellers are considered to be an entrepreneurial group and are to be encouraged 
from a PSD perspective, but this is not the cheapest way to provide water and regulation can 
be difficult. Rather than indicating the dynamism of the private sector, these providers can be 
viewed as a sign of the limitations of the public delivery system.  
DFID, in a drive to promote policies to develop the private sector, points out that 90 per 
cent of jobs in the developing world are in that sector (DFID, 2005). The implication is that 
donor efforts will reach more people if they focus on private enterprise. The public sector 
therefore accounts for about 10 per cent of jobs in developing regions. In the United Kingdom 
the corresponding figure is around 20.4 per cent, so the public sector accounts for about twice Working Paper  11 
 
 
the proportion of employment in the UK than in developing regions. Thus, rather than 
focusing development efforts on the private sector because that is where people are 
employed, an alternative interpretation would be that the state sector in developing countries 
is weak and under-resourced. Given the importance of a strong state for the development  
of the private sector, arguably this is where donor efforts should be focused. 
3  POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE PSP IN SSA INFRASTRUCTURE 
This section looks at specific policies that have been adopted by governments and donors  
to attract more private investment into water and electricity in SSA. The focus is on larger 
investments, usually requiring international finance. This region and these sectors have trailed 
others in attracting investors. In the water sector, private participation in infrastructure  
(PPI) has taken the form of long-term concessions, lease and management contracts, and 
outsourcing specific bulk water treatment plants. In the electricity sector, PPI typically takes  
the form of either a concession or management contract for an electricity distribution utility or 
private generation through the establishment of an independent power producer (IPP).  
In the past, donors used to persuade developing-country governments to implement 
privatisation by means of coercion, privatisation being a condition to receive debt relief, for 
example (as with the case of water in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania). More recently, donors have 
focused on private firms and an extensive array of facilities has evolved to encourage investors 
to invest in SSA infrastructure (see Appendix 1 for details). Many of the facilities are based on 
the idea of reducing the risk exposure of potential investors. There is a sense that if the risk 
profile of SSA investments could be reduced, there would be more investment—for example: 
 
“A shortage of risk capital—the provision of finance for investments perceived to be 
risky—is holding back the potential for pro-poor growth in many countries.”  
HoC, 2006a: 49 
 
“Donors and governments should help mitigate risks that the private sector cannot 
afford to take.” 
HoC, 2006a: 82 
3.1  GOVERNMENTS  
With donor support, countries have taken specific measures on infrastructure investment, 
measures that are ostensibly intended to improve the efficiency and governance of delivery 
in general, but that have the added goal of making the sector more attractive to potential 
private investors. Two key measures in this regard are restructuring and pricing, which are 
explored below. 
The water and electricity sectors have seen the widespread implementation of a process 
of unbundling, in terms of both geography and function. In the electricity sector, power 
generation is separated from transmission (which usually remains with the state) and 
distribution (which is ring-fenced and has been privatised in some cases). This was supposed to 
pave the way for competition in the generation of electricity, but such ambitions have largely 
been dropped in SSA. Such restructuring, however, allows the private sector to step more 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
easily into electricity generation through the establishment of IPPs. These can easily be  
ring-fenced with a single reliable customer, which is the state-owned transmission company.  
In the water sector there has been unbundling on a regional level through decentralisation 
policies and the separation of water in rural areas and small towns, as well as the separation  
of water from sanitation. In many cases, there has been a functional separation of utility 
management and infrastructure ownership. Typically, as a prelude to water privatisation, the 
state establishes some kind of asset management unit which is responsible for investing in 
infrastructure. The private sector is invited to take on only the management of the water utility, 
so there is no requirement or responsibility for more risky operations such as investment in 
infrastructure (see, for example, Angola, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Cameroon).  
As regards pricing, countries in SSA have a history of providing water and electricity  
below cost. While such an approach is not necessarily a problem if it is part of a cohesive  
policy of subsidisation, low pricing is not fiscally sustainable in much of the region. Hence many 
governments and donors have pushed for a transition to full cost-recovery pricing. While pricing 
issues are a feature of financial sustainability generally, regardless of PSP, investors prefer prices 
(rather than subsidies) to cover costs, since this reduces their reliance on government payments. 
A transition to full cost-recovery pricing is thus important in attracting investors. In Zambia,  
for example, raising tariffs is regarded as crucial in order to attract investor interest:  
 
“The current electricity tariff in Zambia does not cover costs of supply. To attract 
investment in new generation capacity, a financially sustainable power sector is vital.  
At current tariff level, no investors will be interested in new generation capacity.”  
World Bank, 2007a: 3 
 
According to Farlam (2005) in his review of PPPs in Africa, the issue of pricing is  
crucial to avoid political fallout and to ensure that the contract is commercially viable. 
Across the continent, with World Bank support, the concept of a “pass-through”  
on costs has become generally accepted. This means that variations in exogenous costs such 
as inflation, exchange rates and fuel are automatically incorporated into the tariff structure  
for water and electricity. In Ghana, for example, the regulatory agency determines tariffs  
“at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the tariff determination”. There is an automatic 
adjustment formula for the pricing of petrol, electricity and water, which is defined to ensure 
full cost recovery at Ghana's state-owned oil refinery and utilities by passing onto consumers 
changes in the costs of exogenously determined inputs (GoG, 2004). 
Nigeria and Uganda also have cost pass-throughs in the electricity sector, which mean 
that fluctuations in exchange rate, fuel costs and inflation are automatically passed through  
to end-users. In Cape Verde, a review of energy and water pricing is to include the 
implementation of an automatic tariff adjustment to modify electricity and water prices in 
response to changes in the cost of imported petroleum products. The aim is to depoliticise 
price setting and reduce pressure on the budget (OECD, 2008b). 
In Uganda, a clear reason for automatic tariff adjustment is to provide operating 
companies with a reasonable return and profit, to give confidence to current and new 
investors, and to “provide for future progress towards a commercially competitive system” 
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because this “therefore promotes greater efficiency” (OECD, 2008b). As a result, domestic users 
pay more than industrial consumers because the cost of delivering services to them is higher.  
A significant depreciation of the Ugandan shilling would cause tariffs to increase sharply even 
when everything else is stable. Tariffs are highly sensitive to changes in fuel prices, given the 
increasing share of thermal power in the total energy mix. Increases in fuel prices and inflation 
are passed through to the consumer on a quarterly basis (ERA, 2006). 
Cost-recovery policies are appealing because they appear politically neutral. In the water 
sector, for example, the importance of pricing was emphasised by the chief executive officer  
of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), discussing PPPs:  
 
“There are political and social obstacles to getting water allocation right. We also lack  
the incentives for optimal water allocations where water is priced below the cost at 
source and at the tap. Without this basic market mechanism, water projects will struggle 
to attract investors and waste will continue.”  
Lars Thunell, IFC chief, speaking in Stockholm, August 2008 (emphasis added).2 
 
Here, pricing water at cost is described as a “basic market mechanism” but the issue is 
more complex. First, it is not clear what costs should be covered, especially where there are 
high rates of leakage and inefficiencies in production. Second, cost-recovery policies can 
deepen regional inequities if accompanied by decentralisation (Bayliss, 2008). Third, 
affordability is a major constraint, and providing services to the poorest users should be a 
central rather than peripheral component of water and energy policy. Fourth, increasing prices 
can reduce consumption, which can adversely affect the overall revenue position and can have 
negative social consequences. 
Finally, there is a limit to how high prices can go. In the electricity sector there is little space 
to raise prices further. While some electricity tariffs have been kept low, the cross-country 
average tariff in SSA is high at US$ 0.13 per kwh—almost double those in other parts of the 
developing world and almost as high as in OECD countries. Yet prices are barely covering costs 
(IMF, 2008a). In the water sector, prices in SSA are also high compared to other developing 
regions, but still remain below cost-recovery levels (Ouayoro, 2008). Continuing to focus on 
increasing prices rather than other forms of revenue management will cripple consumers and 
undermines development objectives as services become increasingly unaffordable. 
3.2  DONORS 
There are various ways in which donors encourage private investment in infrastructure. 
While much of the literature on PPPs in industrialised economies points to the need to 
transfer risk to the private sector in order to secure efficiency gains, in practice governments 
and donors in SSA are shaping parameters to reduce the private sector’s risk exposure in 
order to encourage investment.  
Various donors are involved in initiatives to promote PSP in infrastructure, but the most 
important is the World Bank. Not only does the Bank provide loans to governments through 
the International Development Association (IDA)—the division of the World Bank Group that 
provides long-term, interest-free loans to the poorest developing countries—but the IFC—the 
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in many aspects of donor policy to promote PSP in infrastructure. The IFC focuses on providing 
finance, equity, guarantees and advice to encourage private investment in “frontier markets”. 
In addition, a number of other donor-sponsored initiatives for the private sector have emerged 
over the past decade as donor support for PSP has grown.  
There is now a confusing array of donor programmes for PSP; Appendix 1 provides a list  
of some of them. Recently, six new facilities have been created under the aegis of the Private 
Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), which was established in 2002 by donors from the 
United Kingdom (DFID), Switzerland (SECO), the Netherlands (DGIS), Sweden (SIDA), Austria 
(ADA), Ireland (IrishAid) and the World Bank. The total funding capacity of PIDG is US$ 700m 
(Hodges, 2008) and the Group aims to encourage private sector participation in developing 
country infrastructure through the facilities set out in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Component Facilities of the Private Infrastructure Development Group 
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3.2.1  Sector Loans 
This section explores three main ways in which donors encourage PSP in infrastructure.  
First, the World Bank provides concessional loans to developing-country governments through 
the IDA. These loans are for physical investment in infrastructure and for institutional reform, 
and often the institutional component is based on some form of PSP. It may be that efforts to 
develop PSP have not been successful, or that the country context is so fragile (as, for example, 
where states are emerging from conflict) that PSP is not possible at this stage, in which case 
policies often focus instead on creating the right conditions to attract PSP in the future. 
Second, donors work with governments on country policies to create an attractive investment 
climate, termed the “enabling environment”. Finally, donors provide incentives and support 
directly to private investors.  
Most countries in SSA have loans from the World Bank, many of which are for physical 
investments and institutional reform in the electricity and water sectors. For more than a 
decade, a common theme in these loans has been institutional reform based on some kind  
of PSP. Even where PSP has not been achieved, the focus is on stepping back from this to 
create conditions that will be more conducive to PSP. In July 2008, for example, the World Bank 
agreed a seven-year, US$ 113.2 million project, of which the IDA will provide US$ 57 million,  
to improve the delivery of water in Angola. The project is to help with an institutional reform 
that includes “designing systems which will enable the government to maximise the use of the 
private sector in the delivery of services to both improve the quantity and quality of services Working Paper  15 
 
 
provided and to reduce the cost to the consumer” (World Bank, 2008a: 3). In Guinea Bissau, 
“private sector participation in EAGB's [the combined water and electricity utility] operations is 
necessary to improve efficiency and effectiveness” (World Bank, 2006a: 22). In Ethiopia, the 
intention is to introduce private sector participation in the water sector on a relatively small 
scale so as to pave the way for a larger investment in the future, possibly with the support  
of the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (World Bank, 2007b).  
In Madagascar, a two-year management contract for the state water and electricity utility, 
Jirama, is to be replaced by a longer-term “solution” based on a PPP (World Bank, 2006b). 
Elsewhere, failed attempts at privatisation have led to a revised strategy. For example, the 
government of Malawi has tried for several years to privatise the Lilongwe and Blantyre water 
boards. The latest policy is to start with a service contract, which will be followed by a deeper 
form of PPP (World Bank, 2007c). In Senegal, renewed efforts are afoot for PPP in the electricity 
utility Senelec after two failed attempts between 1999 and 2002 (World Bank, 2005a). In Benin, 
the privatisation of the electricity utility was a component of a 2004 World Bank project, but in 
2007 it became clear that this would not be possible and so instead the aim is to implement 
internal restructuring between January 2008 and December 2009 with a view to privatisation 
after this period (IMF, 2008b). In Nigeria, a World Bank project aims to develop PPP in the water 
sector in Lagos. In 2000–2002, the IDA worked with the IFC on a plan for a concession for Lagos 
water but there was little private sector interest in a concession. As a result the plan is to start 
with a smaller, performance-based contract on which to build more profound forms of PPP 
(World Bank, 2005b).  
Even where privatisation was achieved but failed to be sustained, the response is not to look 
at public sector provision of water and electricity but to focus on restructuring with a view to 
future privatisation. For example, Cape Verde privatised its water and electricity utility, Electra,  
in 1999 with a 50-year concession. In 2006 the government had to buy it back because it was in 
financial difficulties. The approach now, however, is not to focus on public service delivery but it 
is expected that Electra will be re-privatised following the work of a new management team 
(OECD, 2008b). 
World Bank loans are vital for infrastructure in many countries in SSA. Often the bulk  
of the loan is for essential investment in networks, including both rehabilitation and extension. 
The need for such finance means that the institutional reforms come with the infrastructure 
finance. Throughout the project appraisal documents that are produced by the Bank in 
connection with projects in SSA, the tone indicates that the private sector is clearly the  
preferred service provider and the state is second best.  
3.2.2  Enabling Environment 
Donors encourage governments to create a country environment that is conducive to private 
investment and better suited to PSP. This involves providing support to governments to draw 
up projects that are of interest to investors, as well as wider initiatives to improve the 
investment climate more generally. Support can take the form of publications and technical 
assistance. For example, a recent publication co-sponsored by the Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa (ICA), the World Bank and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), 
“Attracting Investors to African Public Private Partnerships: A Project Preparation Guide “, 
provides advice to governments on designing projects and the tendering process to attract 
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in telecoms shows that there are people who are willing to pay for services; hence the problem 
is not one of demand but of supply. Policymakers should therefore focus on improving 
conditions to attract investors, thereby easing supply constraints.  
The PPIAF is a multi-donor technical assistance facility that provides policy, legal and 
regulatory support for governments. There are two strands to its operations: it provides 
technical assistance to governments on how to engage the private sector and on 
dissemination of best practice in PPPs. The PPIAF’s involvement assumes that the privatisation 
decision has already been taken and the Facility advises on the best way of effecting it. From 
2000 to 2007, PPIAF operations in SSA amounted to US$ 41.47 million. Between its inception in 
1999 and the end of 2007, the funds received by the PPIAF totalled US$ 148 million (PPIAF 
2007 Annual Report). The United Kingdom is the biggest donor, contributing over 50 per cent 
of the PPIAF’s funds. 
There have been criticisms of the PPIAF. For example, the Facility’s general policies on  
the business environment fail to capture country-specific factors. Support for governments  
to implement PPPs can entail the adoption of a piecemeal approach, which can lead to 
fragmentation and a dominance of PPP over other policy alternatives. Focusing on promoting 
the private sector can mean that wider sectoral needs, for example in water delivery, are 
neglected. The PPIAF also devotes resources to what is known as “consensus building”, which 
comes down to persuading communities of the benefits of privatisation. 
In May 2007 a campaign including more than 138 civil society groups and trade unions 
from 48 countries delivered an open letter urging donor governments to withdraw support for 
the PPIAF because of the efforts to privatise the supply and delivery of water, arguing that the 
PPIAF’s bias towards private sector “solutions” for water access represents a poor use of aid 
money. In February 2007, the Norwegian government withdrew its support for the PPIAF on 
the grounds that private sector involvement in the water sector will not increase access for the 
poor. In May of the same year, Italy also withdrew its support for the PPIAF.3  
Other donor facilities have been set up to help governments create an environment that 
is more likely to attract investors in infrastructure. Within the PIDG, discussed above,  
DevCo helps to spread the cost of expert consultants (including the services of the IFC) for 
governments undertaking PPI projects. The Technical Assistance Facility provides grants  
for consultancy and training for governments on a range of aspects of PPI, including 
infrastructure development strategies and mechanisms to promote private sector 
involvement, advice on policy and regulatory reforms that seek to facilitate infrastructure 
financing by the private sector, support for pilot transactions and capacity building. InfraCo 
becomes involved in projects at an early stage by taking an equity stake. The IFC also advises 
governments on privatisation transactions, and in 2008 DevCo and the IFC appointed 
consultants to conduct studies for a planned hydro project in Zambia.4 The IFC has also advised 
on PPPs in the water sector in Cameroon, Senegal and Madagascar.  
Moving beyond infrastructure, the IFC, along with the World Bank and other donors,  
has put much emphasis on helping countries to create an attractive environment for  
investors with the ‘Doing Business’ (DB) project (www.doingbusiness.org/). This is an annual 
benchmarking exercise based on data on the costs to firms of business regulations. In addition 
to documenting the status of reforms in each country, DB also aims to motivate policymakers to 
implement pro-business reforms.  Working Paper  17 
 
 
Each year, the project ranks 181 economies on a series of 10 indicators5 intended to 
capture the ease with which it is possible to operate a business. A high ranking on the ease  
of doing business index means the regulatory environment is conducive to the operation of 
business. Countries that implement policies that are favourable to business development are 
celebrated and move up the ranking. Africa dominates the lower end of the scale. Of the 
bottom 30 (and Iraq is 30th from bottom), 22 countries are from SSA. 
A recent evaluation of the DB project by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) had a number of criticisms: the DB project covered less than half of the typical complaints 
made by businesses, which also include access and cost of financing, infrastructure, political 
risk and so on. In addition, the project only covers written laws, not custom or practice and 
implementation of the laws, and it does not cover the benefits that regulation might provide. 
The informants for the indicators are mainly lawyers and there are often very few informants 
for each indicator.  
Furthermore, tax rate indicators are not of the tax burden or red tape but of fiscal policy. 
The top performers in tax rates include tax havens and oil states. The indicators cannot be 
useful for cross-country comparisons and cannot provide guidance on the sequencing of 
reforms. It is not possible to link regulatory change to specific macroeconomic outcomes  
(IEG, 2008a). Seven of DB’s 10 indicators presume that lessening regulation is always desirable, 
whether a country starts with a little regulation or a lot. Reform as measured by the DB 
indicators typically means reducing regulations and their burden, irrespective of their potential 
benefits. The danger is that the focus on such reforms may distract policymakers from more 
important development objectives (IEG, 2008a). 
Considerable resources have been devoted to helping governments attract private 
investors into African infrastructure. As the IEG evaluation outlined above indicates  
(IEG, 2008a), focusing only on what will be good for investors may not lead to equitable 
development outcomes for water and electricity, nor in the wider economy.  
3.2.3  Donor Facilities for Private Firms 
A number of donor facilities have evolved that provide specific facilities to encourage private 
firms to invest in SSA and in infrastructure. These facilities have two main elements: the 
provision of finance (in some form or other) and provision of guarantees/insurance. The range 
of available products to reduce risk exposure is extensive and complex—see Matsukawa and 
Habeck (2007) for a detailed analysis. Appendix 2 contains some definitions of the terms used 
in this section. The IFC division of the World Bank has the most comprehensive range of 
facilities. Financial support for the private sector is also provided by other divisions of the 
World Bank and by other agencies such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and  
the European Investment Bank (EIB).  
The IFC is the largest source of multilateral funding to the private sector in the developing 
world, and its funding is growing. In 2007, new IFC commitments reached US$ 10 billion, 
double the level of just four years earlier (Thapar, 2007). In the energy sector, the IFC has 
played a major role in securing financing for some large private electricity projects such  
as the Azito project in Côte d’Ivoire and Bujagali in Uganda. To date, the IFC has had little 
involvement in the water sector in SSA, though it has advised on water transactions in 
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French firm, Veolia AMI, which has concessions for the water utilities in Gabon and Niger.  
The IFC is clearly planning to expand its role in water and sanitation: 
 
“We believe that providing clean water and sanitation services is a real business 
opportunity … The debate is shifting. Instead of ‘should the private sector be involved in 
water?’ the question is ‘how can we work together for sensible and fair solutions?’”  
IFC Executive Vice President and CEO Lars H. Thunell, speaking at the end of World Water 
Week in Stockholm, 2008.6 
 
The IFC aims to leverage funds from the private sector, and thus IFC loans are usually 
limited to 25 per cent of the total estimated project costs for greenfield projects or, on an 
exceptional basis, 35 per cent in small projects. For expansion projects, the IFC may provide up 
to 50 per cent of the project cost, provided its investments do not exceed 25 per cent of the 
total capitalisation of the project company. The IFC provides A and B loans. Generally, A loans 
range from US$ 1 million to US$ 100 million. B loans are syndicated loans whereby the IFC 
arranges loans to projects that are financed through the IFC by commercial banks and other 
financial institutions. The IFC sometimes takes equity stakes in private sector companies 
investing in developing countries’ financial institutions, and portfolio and investment funds in 
developing countries. The Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF), established in January 
2002 as part of the PIDG (see Table 3), is a US$ 365 million debt fund that also provides finance 
for firms investing in infrastructure, specifically in Africa. To date the EAIF has disbursed  
US$ 315.5 million. Projects have included just one company in the electricity sector  
(US$ 30 million to AES Sonel, the operator of the Cameroonian electricity distribution utility) 
and no water projects. Over a third of disbursements have been to telecoms projects. 
In addition to finance, donors also provide guarantees to private investors. A World Bank 
division, MIGA, provides political risk guarantees for private firms investing in developing 
countries. MIGA offers private investors guarantees against transfer restriction, expropriation, 
war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract. In 2007, SSA accounted for 18 per cent of 
MIGA’s outstanding portfolio (www.miga.org/).  
Multilateral development banks offer private sector investors partial credit guarantees 
(PCGs) that apply only to a portion of the funding but that pay out regardless of the reason for 
non-payment. These guarantees are usually applied to state-sponsored projects that involve 
sovereign borrowing. Multilateral development banks also provide partial risk guarantees 
(PRGs), which are guarantees against particular project risks such as risk of default due to non-
compliance with contractual obligations undertaken by governments or certain political force 
majeure events. Examples of common obligations include the maintenance of an agreed-upon 
regulatory framework, the delivery of inputs and payment for outputs. In addition, the risks of 
currency transfer and convertibility can also be covered by a PRG.  
The Azito power plant in Côte d’Ivoire was the first to use a World Bank (IDA) PRG loan  
in 1999.7 The guarantee applies to a debt tranche of US$ 30 million, which is the portion  
of finance raised from commercial banks and the guarantee is against payment default.  
The total project cost is US$ 223 million and it also has a number of IFC facilities in its 
financing structure (Nandjee, 2006). IDA guarantees are expected to be used in more 
projects. In Guinea Bissau, a proposed IDA PRG for the power component of the World Bank 
project is expected to provide “a key incentive for highly qualified private sector operators to Working Paper  19 
 
 
participate” (World Bank, 2006a: 26). In Senegal, PRGs are expected to reduce the cost of 
raising the long-term financing required to develop Senegal's electricity infrastructure 
(World Bank, 2005a).  
Both the IFC and EAIF offer loans on commercial rather than concessional terms. In addition 
to those mentioned above, various other facilities have evolved to stimulate investment, such as 
export credit facilities and IFC initiatives like PEP Africa and Infraventures. There is also the 
Investment Climate Facility and the Business Action for Africa. As extensive array of facilities  
exist (see Appendix 1) with varying terms and conditions but all with similar aims.  
To conclude, then, a great deal of donor attention and resources have focused on trying 
to increase private participation in infrastructure. This involves shaping the institutional 
framework, providing advice to governments on PSP, and providing finance and guarantees to 
investors. Even though the vast majority of water and electricity service providers in SSA and 
elsewhere are in the public domain, there are no comparable facilities for public providers.  
The policy momentum is so deeply ingrained that PSP is often perceived as an end in itself.  
For example, a key objective of donor facilities like those provided by the IFC and EAIF, which 
provide finance to private sector infrastructure projects, is to “leverage” private sector finance, 
and this is a goal in its own right. The World Bank’s Sustainable Infrastructure Action Plan for 
2009–2011 plans to scale-up PPP programmes using all parts of the World Bank Group.  
The plan states that: 
 
“One measure of the effectiveness of these efforts is the amount of private finance 
leveraged by WBG interventions.”  
World Bank, 2008b: 15 
 
This does not allow for consideration of the quality of the private finance that is leveraged. 
The leveraging of private sector finance in infrastructure is usually achieved at a high price to 
compensate for the perceived risks, with long-term contracts and tight government guarantees 
(see the next section). The mere raising of private finance alone does not necessarily make for the 
best development outcomes. Creating an attractive investment climate with the above tools is 
not without some cost, as discussed below.  
4  OUTCOMES 
This section looks at the outcomes of efforts to promote PSP in infrastructure. These are 
grouped under four headings: investment, sector governance, risk transfer and project finance. 
The section shows that there has been little investment from private firms in water and 
electricity in SSA, despite extensive efforts by donors and governments to reduce the  
private sector’s risk exposure.  
4.1  INVESTMENT 
In the water sector there has been very little investment. There has been more in electricity  
but it has been tightly secured and designed to encounter minimal risk. Project designs are 
reflecting a reduction in investor appetite for risk. Rather than deep forms of privatisation  
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of commercial risk), there has been more emphasis on Build-Operate-Transfer contracts  
(where the private sector is contracted to design and operate a facility for a specified period). 
These are underpinned by long-term fixed contracts that incorporate purchase agreements, 
often with take-or-pay clauses (Torres de Mästle and Izaguirre, 2008). Data on actual volumes 
of private sector investment in infrastructure are limited. The most easily available and widely 
cited data come from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database 
(http://ppi.worldbank.org/), but this contains data on what are termed “investment 
commitments” rather than amounts that are actually transferred. While it can be useful  
to use this data to look at general trends, therefore, it must be kept in mind that these are 
commitments rather than actual investments (see Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
Figure 2 shows overall PPI investments from 1990 across sectors. Clearly, telecoms 
dominates the picture and total investment trends mirrors trends in telecoms. Water has 
attracted least investment and electricity has tailed off from a 1997 peak. 
FIGURE 2 
Total Private Sector Investment Commitments in Infrastructure, by Sector 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Total Private Sector Investment Commitments in Infrastructure, by Region 
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On a regional level, Figure 3 shows that investment funds have been dominated by  
flows to Latin America initially, and more recently to Europe and Central Asia, and to South 
Asia. SSA has trailed.  
Turning then to water and sanitation, Figure 4 shows that recent investment in water  
and sanitation was dominated by East Asia, particularly China. In electricity, a similar picture 
emerges (Figure 5).  
FIGURE 4 
Private Investment Commitments in Water and Sewerage 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Private Investment Commitments in Electricity (US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
The charts above give an overview of what has happened to attempts to generate private 
sector investment in infrastructure. Investment peaked around 1997 and then tailed off. 
Investment was concentrated in telecoms and in Latin America initially, and more recently in 
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investment. Thus privatisation initiatives brought least benefit to these sectors in Africa.  
There, PPPs have been more successful in sectors such as ports, telecommunications,  
transport and ecotourism projects than in power and water (Farlam, 2005). 
Looking at SSA, the charts below show what has happened in terms of investment 
commitments in water and electricity. These are effectively a close-up view of the plotlines 
for SSA, which are shown at the bottom of Figures 4 and 5. In the energy sector (Figure 6), 
private investment appears to be volatile and the amount is not high compared to the 
annual investment requirement of US$ 42.6 billion (see Section 2.1 above). In the water 
sector (Figure 7), there were virtually no private investment commitments after 2001.  
Clearly, the private sector has not delivered any of the investment required in the water 
sector. Other research also indicates that privatisation has generated very little private  
sector finance (Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
FIGURE 6 
Private Investment Commitments in Energy, SSA (US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. 
 
FIGURE 7 
Private Investment Commitments in Water, SSA (US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. Working Paper  23 
 
 
Why, then has there been such a weak private sector response in SSA? Bertolini attributes 
the lack of investor interest in SSA to the nature of infrastructure investments, which require 
high up-front costs and then entail a long payback period, uncertainties in pricing and 
regulatory policies, and the fact that there are better investment prospects elsewhere and thus 
private infrastructure funds have mostly gone to developed countries or telecommunications, 
where the payback period is shorter (Bertolini, 2008). Other research into drivers of PPPs in the 
water sector in developing countries finds that the size of the population and ability to pay are 
significant factors in achieving a PPP contract (Jensen and Blanc-Brude, 2006). In SSA, many 
end-users cannot afford to pay prices for services that would allow a commercial rate of return. 
Possibly in response to poor private sector responses, there has been an increase in 
South-South cooperation and in investments from state utilities rather than purely private 
companies. For example, in 2007 a consortium led by the Moroccan public water utility, ONEP, 
was awarded a contract for the management of the Cameroon water utility, SNEC.8 In 2006, a 
contract for the management of Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) was awarded to a 
consortium, Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL), consisting of the Dutch public water utility, 
Vitens, and a South African bulk water supplier, Rand Water. In the energy sector, Gratwick  
and Eberhard (2008) found that IPPs were more successful if, rather than being carried out  
by purely private firms, they were effected by what these authors term “development-minded” 
organisations such as Globeleq. The latter is owned by the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (CDC), which is a development enterprise of Britain’s DFID, and Industrial 
Promotions Services (IPS), a subsidiary of the Aga Khan Foundation.  
As a rule, PPPs (and privatisation more generally) are preferred where competitive market 
prices can be established, since this will result in a greater transfer of risk to the private sector. 
Weak investor interest means that there is little competition in awarding contracts and some 
calls for tenders for PPPs have yielded only one bid. The study of African IPPs by Gratwick and 
Eberhard (2007) clearly demonstrates the impact of the investment climate. They find that the 
number of bids submitted to international competitive bids (ICBs) in North African countries is 
generally double to triple those submitted to ICBs in East Africa. They cite three East African 
IPPs that received only two or three bids. According to the mainstream literature on PPPs, 
competition is vital to ensure that sufficient levels of risk are transferred to the private  
sector (see Section 4.3). The main infrastructure competition in SSA, however, comes from 
governments competing for private sector funds rather than firms competing for contracts, 
and the degree to which risk can be transferred to the private sector is much lower.  
4.2  SECTOR GOVERNANCE 
Many states in SSA are weak and have shallow legal and regulatory frameworks. Some states 
are relatively new, recently emerging from conflict. Policymakers have pushed PSP in part 
because of low levels of state capacity. Weak states, however, are a major constraint to PSP 
policies. The introduction of PSP does not remove the problems of state capacity but does 
provide alternative ways in which weaknesses may be manifested. A key example is corruption, 
which has been highlighted as a major constraint to development in the water sector 
(Transparency International, 2008). Rather than removing corruption, PSP can exacerbate it—
for example, when deals are done behind closed doors, undermining the possible benefits that 
might be achieved through increased efficiency (Plummer and Cross, 2007: 234). The private 
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In weak states, sectors may lack policy coherence. In the energy sector, for example,  
many countries lack a single agency responsible for power sector planning and procurement. 
According to the ICA, the inefficiency of African power utilities is a major bottleneck to progress 
in the electricity sector (ICA, 2008). The African energy sector is in crisis and high-cost, short-term 
emergency power projects are being established (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). Capacity in  
the water sector has been further hampered by decentralisation programmes whereby the 
responsibility delegated to subsovereign parties is not necessarily matched by the financial 
resources and capacity corresponding to such responsibilities (Mehta and Mehta, 2008).  
The process of implementing PSP programmes requires a high skills base and can be 
costly. In the United Kingdom, tendering is estimated to last for an average of 34 months and 
transaction costs can reach about 5–10 per cent of the capital cost of a project; hence PPP is 
considered to be unsuitable for projects of low capital value. The British Treasury currently 
considers PFI projects for less than £ 20 million to be poor value for money (Iossa and 
Martimort, 2008). In developing countries the time period is often considerably longer.  
With weak state capacity, governments lack the skills to draw up project specifications, 
design effectively and monitor project progress. While this is a constraint under public provision, 
it raises specific challenges for PPPs. The growth of PPPs has led to a revision of the role of public 
sector workers, who have become PPP managers rather than implementers. Contracts need to 
be effectively monitored and regularly reviewed. The government's lack of skills may mean that 
the expertise required to monitor and regulate a contract is insufficient. With the PPP contract, 
firms typically make greater effort at the start in order to maintain their reputation. If investment 
is to be reimbursed there is an incentive to leave this until the end of the project, and thus 
projects often have an inefficient level of investment (Iossa and Martimort, 2008). Weak 
government skills can undermine efficiency gains that might arise from a PPP, and government 
can be at a disadvantage if the contract has to be re-negotiated. This is exacerbated by low levels 
of competition for contracts, as discussed in Section 4.1. In its Sustainable Infrastructure Action 
Plan, the World Bank acknowledges the need for a strong state: 
 
“The public sector needs strong capacities to understand the commitments entered in 
the partnerships with the private sector and to design and regulate these projects.”  
World Bank, 2008: 14 
 
Arguably, by the time the public sector has sufficient capacity to effectively implement PSP, 
it could just as easily provide the service itself. 
The traditional view of bargaining positions over the course of a contract is that the 
standing of the private investor weakens considerably once heavy infrastructure starts to  
be built (the obsolescing bargain), as the original deal becomes obsolete and the host country 
can expropriate the benefits. However, in their study of power generation contracts in SSA, 
Gratwick and Eberhard (2006) found no evidence of this , suggesting that governments remain 
in a weak bargaining position, dependent on foreign firms that they could only attract with 
extensive concessions, sovereign guarantees and donor support.  
A robust legal framework and a predictable regulatory regime are better for PPPs.  
Contracts are usually long-term. It is impossible to include provisions for every eventuality for, 
say, a 30-year period in the contract at the start of the project. Over the course of the contract, 
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underestimate costs in order to win infrastructure contracts. Changing societal needs may lead 
to the need for renegotiation of the contract, and it is more straightforward for the parties to step 
outside the contract terms in the context of a robust legal and regulatory framework. In SSA, 
however, many countries have a fragile political and regulatory framework. This poses additional 
country risks for investors that face the possibility that their profit stream will be affected by 
changing political and regulatory parameters in countries where these are not well established.  
In addition, where contracts are drawn up for long periods, the government that 
implemented the contract may well not be in place when the future liabilities fall due.  
It is therefore important that the wider legal framework can support the contract, and that it is 
not based on one specific political party. Contract renegotiations have been pervasive in PPP 
arrangements worldwide. In Latin American countries there have been numerous instances of 
governments having failed to honour contract terms and of projects having been abandoned. 
Often, new governments fail to approve the price increases or tariff pass-throughs that 
previous governments agreed to—see Guasch (2004); Iossa and Martimort (2008). In SSA, few 
PSP contracts in the power sector have collapsed, though many have been renegotiated. In the 
water sector, 40 per cent of contracts have been cancelled before completion (Foster, 2008). 
The nature of regulation is different in SSA, partly because of weak capacity but also 
because of failed efforts at privatisation, and thus it is the state that is regulated. In much of  
the region, since privatisation has not materialised, the function of the regulator is rather hazy 
because in the absence of firms to regulate, the regulator has to regulate the government. 
While this has meant that some of the more traditional roles of the regulator—such as the use 
of sanctions in the event of non-performance—have had to adapt, the regulator can perform 
an effective monitoring function and provide some scrutiny of state performance.  
Estache and Rossi (2008), on the basis of a study of electricity distribution, conclude that 
the establishment of a regulatory agency in developing countries is associated with higher 
social welfare. A weak domestic legal framework can mean that investors may opt to enforce 
the terms of a contract through recourse to international bodies. Research into the drivers of 
PPP contracts in the water sector in developing countries finds that successful contracts are 
associated with government effectiveness, the protection of property rights, control of 
corruption, and the rule of law (Jensen and Blanc Brude, 2006). Contract enforcement, 
however, was not found to be so significant. This is attributed to the fact that few contracts 
accord legal competence to local courts, and international PPP contracts rely on international 
arbitration facilities (Jensen and Blanc Brude, 2006).  
In an effort to compensate for weak regulatory capacity, some have considered 
outsourcing regulation to the private sector—see, for example, Tremolet (2007)—but at some 
stage some interface with the state is required. Lack of skills leads the government to spend 
large amounts of money on advisors when negotiating with businesses (OECD, 2008a). There 
have been criticisms that the growing reliance on private consultancies (or the 'consultocracy') 
increases the influence of private sector management consultants on the reform agenda and 
processes of the public sector. The concern is that profit-maximising private firms will hijack 
public sector reform processes and that the traditional distinction between the public and 
private realms is becoming blurred as private consultants enjoy undemocratic influence over 
government policy with little accountability. There is a danger of conflicts of interest when 
consultants are involved in devising policies that will subsequently affect them and or their 
clients. Where public capacity is weak, who is to guard the public interest (Hodge and 
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4.3  RISK TRANSFER  
If the private sector is to be more efficient than the public sector, it is crucial that sufficient risk 
be transferred to the private party. In order to have an incentive to operate efficiently and at 
least cost, private contractors must bear the risk of their own actions. Even if the private sector 
is more efficient, for the benefit to reach users, improvements depend on the transfer of risk 
(OECD, 2008a). To achieve sufficient transfer of risk, competition is required. The nature  
of PPP contracts is that once they are established they can run for decades and thus are not 
competitive; hence competition is required at the bidding stage. The presence of too few 
bidders can compromise the PPP gains (OECD, 2008a).  
Discussion of the numerous risks associated with the delivery of infrastructure has 
become more sophisticated as PPPs have gained momentum. The risks include construction 
risk; financial risk (including variations in exchange and inflation rates); availability risk 
(continuity of service provision); demand risk; and residual value risk. Under a PPP, the 
government seeks to transfer at least some of these risks to the private sector. In addition,  
the investor might face political or regulatory risk of expropriation from the host government. 
Another dimension of risk that is rarely discussed is the risk that the government faces, such as 
non-performance or withdrawal on the part of the private firm.  
According to most commentators, the basic principle of risk sharing is that risk should lie 
with the party best able to manage it—see, for example, OECD (2008a); Akitoby et al. (2007). 
Such a principle is relatively easy to apply to PSP at the ends of the risk spectrum—for example, 
construction risk lies with the private party while political risk lies with the government.  
There are, however, grey areas in between, such as demand risk or exchange rate risk.  
Investors have shown a marked lack of interest in SSA (see above). A key deterrent  
is the perception that the region is a high-risk environment for private investment. Thus an 
important element of policy in the region’s water and electricity sectors is to lower the risk 
exposure for private investors. Instead of promoting risk transfer to maximise efficiency gains, 
policymakers are trying to reduce private sector risk to promote private sector investment  
(see Baietti and Raymond, 2005). This is central to a donor policy that provides finance and 
guarantees for investors, and to restructuring and pricing policies that ring-fence the more 
secure elements of service delivery for PSP, as discussed in the previous section.  
The terms of engagement with the private sector have evolved over the past two decades, 
with PPP contracts making fewer demands on investors. Risk mitigation measures to attract 
investors in SSA need to encompass political and regulatory risk so that investors can be 
assured that their investment is secure. They should also address demand risk in a context of 
high levels of poverty. However, measures to reduce the risk exposure of investors can mean 
that this risk is simply passed to governments and taxpayers. Risks are not reduced, they are 
merely transferred, and these risks may even increase because investors have no incentive to 
reduce exposure and sectors become increasingly fragmented. 
In recent years in the water sector, the volume of investment through PPI has remained 
low at less than US$ 2 billion nearly every year since 2002. The number of new projects, 
however, has been increasing. This is because management and affermage contracts require 
little or no investment from private participants (Torres de Mästle and Izaguirrre, 2008). Initial 
efforts at PPP required firms to take on long-term concession contracts, but these potentially 
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involved large investment commitments that the private sector was expected to recoup from 
user fees or revenues. Concessions signed in 2001–2006, however, include a mix of public and 
private funding for investment and an increasing proportion of PPP contracts are management 
contracts, whereby the government is responsible for all investment (Torres de Mästle and 
Izaguirrre, 2008). In World Bank donor-funded projects in water and electricity in SSA, there is 
greater focus on milder forms of PSP in the immediate future, and the aspiration is for “deeper” 
PSP at some point in the future.  
The current trend is to create two entities for the management of the water sector  
(as discussed in Section 3.1 above). One is state-owned and is responsible for ownership of  
the assets and for investment in infrastructure. The other is responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the utility and for revenue management, and it is this component that is privatised, 
usually through a management contract. Such arrangements reflect the fact that the private 
sector does not want to take on the risk of investment and therefore such contracts require 
little if any financial commitment on the part of the investor. This approach has been adopted 
in several countries in the region where a management contract has been implemented 
(Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania) or where privatisation is planned in the future (Angola).  
Similar practices have been used to reduce private sector risk in the electricity sector.  
In Senegal, after two failed privatisation attempts, the latest proposal for a PPP aims to give  
the private sector a significant level of participation in the company while not requiring it to 
make a substantial financial commitment at the outset. According to the World Bank project 
document, this will lead to greater efficiencies and the government aims to ask the donor 
community to finance a substantial part of SENELEC's investment programme. Donors have 
realised that programmes can be more successful when the PPP is accompanied by a large 
injection of donor funds (World Bank, 2005a).  
The separation of electricity generation from transmission and distribution has meant that 
it is easier for private firms to establish stand-alone generation projects, and this is the main 
form of PPP in SSA electricity. A few private firms have been involved in electricity distribution 
(in Cameroon and Uganda, for example) but private investment mainly takes the form of IPPs, 
which are associated with specific mechanisms to minimise the risk for investors. There has 
been a sharp increase in short-term power contracts: between 2002 and 2006, at least 18 such 
contracts were signed in 13 countries, mainly in Africa. These contracts usually charge much 
higher prices, involve more government guarantees and transfer less risk to the private sector 
than traditional Build-Operate-Transfer contracts with power purchase agreements (Torres de 
Mästle and Izaguirrre, 2008). 
A key attraction of these power projects is that they do not have to sell to end-users but 
have just one customer, which is usually a state-owned electricity transmission company. In 
addition, most contracts for IPPs in SSA (and in most developing countries) are underwritten 
by a power purchase agreement (PPA). This is a take-or-pay contract whereby the government 
is committed to paying a fixed charge to the private generator whether electricity is used or 
not. These PPAs are usually fixed for decades and the payment terms are established in foreign 
currency. Fluctuations in the exchange rate are passed through in charges to end-users,  
which means that governments and end-users bear exchange rate costs.  
PPAs can be essential to securing funding for a power plant but they can create onerous 
conditions for governments because they are expensive and inflexible. In their study of IPPs in 
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that all the projects evaluated had a long-term PPA with the state-owned utility, lasting  
on average for 20 years. This covered the amount of power that would be sold at what price,  
as well as details such as how plants would be dispatched, fuel metering, interconnection, 
insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of law provisions, refinancing 
arrangements and dispute resolution. Such contracts can lack transparency, since the terms  
of PPAs are usually not made public in the name of commercial confidentiality. Long-term 
contracts can run into difficulties if demand for electricity falls or if alternative cheaper sources 
of electricity are obtained. Long-term contracts may reduce the risk for the private sector, but 
where contracts are on fixed terms they raise risks for the contracting government, such as the 
risk of technological redundancy, because a government may be committed to paying for PPP 
that delivers a service by means of obsolete technology. The more rigid the contract, the more 
risk the government bears, but a flexible contract whereby the private sector assumes higher 
risk levels will be more expensive (OECD, 2008a).  
PPAs are not set in stone and there are cases in which the terms have been modified 
following changes in national circumstances (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2007). But PPAs can tie 
governments to long-term and expensive contracts. The pass-through of exchange costs 
creates a moral hazard, since investors have no incentive to minimise forex exposure. This 
creates a secure investment for the private sector but it can be very costly for governments 
and end-users in the event of a depreciation in the value of domestic currency. In Tanzania,  
for example, IPPs accounted in 2006 for 55 per cent of power generation but 96 per cent  
of payments made by the state-owned power distribution utility, Tanesco (Gratwick and 
Eberhard, 2007). The government of Tanzania has considering buying one of the country’s 
IPPs, IPTL (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2007). 
Infrastructure pricing policies based on cost pass-throughs and automatic tariff 
adjustments (discussed in Section 3.1 above) mean that risks associated with currency 
devaluation, inflation and the costs of key inputs such as fuel are passed through automatically 
to the end-user in the form of price increases. This flies in the face of the paradigm of risk 
management, whereby risks lie with those best able to manage them. In SSA, end-users are not 
the party best able to manage the risk of exchange rate fluctuations and changes in fuel costs. 
They have no control over these costs and cannot diversity from essential services such as 
electricity and water unless they increase the use of less safe alternatives. They cannot spread 
the risk across other aspects of consumption. Firms and governments are better placed to 
“manage” this risk. The fact that these costs are passed to consumers indicates that risk 
allocation is about bargaining power rather than ability to manage specific risks. Consumers  
of utility services in SSA have the least bargaining power. Such an approach is a clear 
demonstration of the way in which the needs of investors take priority over end-users. 
Thus, throughout the region, sector policies and structure are being dictated by the need 
to make investment possibilities more attractive for investors. This approach has had some 
success in terms of project stability, since it is clear that projects are more vulnerable when 
higher levels of risk are transferred to the private sector. A review of electricity sector projects 
found that a higher proportion of projects in distress were those exposed to more commercial 
risk, including divestiture projects. In contrast, PSP in forms such as power generation projects, 
which are far less risky, accounted for only 3 per cent of the projects in distress. Projects that 
are isolated from market risk through PPAs are less prone to distress, and political visibility also 
contributes to distress risk (Covindassamy et al., 2005). But the focus should not be on project 
distress but on service delivery. PSP is not an end in itself and the emphasis should be on the Working Paper  29 
 
 
needs of users rather than project stability. If a contract continues without governments 
defaulting on payments it appears to be successful, but it may not be the best use of 
government (or donor) funds. Isolating and hiving off the profitable and low-risk activities  
to the private sector leaves the state with the more demanding and risky aspects of service 
delivery and less scope for cross-subsidy. Investors will be drawn to the easiest and most 
profitable aspects of service delivery. A policy focus that aims for PSP above all else  
will ensure that this is possible, but the long-term country costs need to be considered.  
Ultimately, the two contracting parties with PSP have different and competing objectives. 
For example, Ghana recently signed a contract with US firm Balkan Energy for a 125 MW 
refurbishment of an electricity barge. According to the Minister for Energy: 
 
“The agreement between Ghana and Balkan Energy underscores the government's 
commitment to see the power problem solved and allow normal operations of business 
in the country."9  
 
The private owner of the company has a different perspective on the investment: 
 
“Balkan Energy expects to bill the Ghana government more than $ 3 billion over  
the next 20 years.”10 
 
These contrasting priorities highlight the enormous challenge of shaping PSP in 
infrastructure so that private commercial interests are channelled to meet a country’s 
economic and social needs. This is difficult enough in middle- and high-income countries,  
but in a context of weak regulatory capacity, massive unmet demand and an absence of 
competition, what is to stop private investors from fleecing developing-country governments, 
and will such a transaction be recorded as a success simply because it is a form of PSP? 
4.4  PROJECT FINANCE AND DONORS 
Guarantees and donor participation can strengthen credit ratings and provide easier access  
to project finance. By using a guarantee provided by a multilateral development bank (MDB),  
a project finance transaction may receive a credit rating higher than the sovereign ceiling and, 
in some cases, as high as the level of the MDB providing the guarantee (Fitch ICBA, 2000). 
Without sovereign guarantees, a donor’s participation can be vital for raising project finance. 
The Kenyan Electricity Regulatory Board takes the view that IPPs are supposed to help 
commercialise the sector and government guarantees work against this. According to 
sponsors of Kenyan power projects, the absence of sovereign guarantees has hampered  
their ability to raise private finance. In Kenya, where there were no sovereign guarantees, 
stakeholders in the Tsavao IPP indicated that the presence of the IFC was critical in arranging 
the debt for the project (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2007).  
Most IPPs in the region have used some kind of donor facility such as a loan, equity or 
guarantee. Certainly these have been effective at bringing in finance to the region. However, 
research by Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) suggests that the complex facilities and extensive 
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measures in relation to IPPs in SSA, Gratwick and Eberhard find that international arbitration 
and sovereign guarantees were the most commonly used type of security. But despite the 
extensive range of perceived risks and the number of different risk insurances available, these 
were not widely used and the authors found no cases of the sovereign guarantee or political 
risk insurance or guarantees being invoked (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2007). Similarly, according 
to a report from the credit ratings agency, Moodys, IFC loans have never been included in a 
sovereign debt rescheduling, nor have payments to the IFC ever been permanently interrupted 
by a general debt-servicing moratorium (Moodys, 2007). This seems to be because the IFC—
and other donor agencies—enjoy what is described as de facto preferred creditor status.  
This means that member governments grant IFC loans preferential access to foreign 
exchange in the event of a foreign exchange crisis. As a result, “IFC loans, including the 
portions taken by participants, are exempt from country risk provisioning when applicable  
and have never been included in general country debt reschedulings” (www.ifc.org). Similarly, 
projects involving MIGA, the World Bank agency that provides risk guarantees, are more likely 
to run smoothly because: “As a member of the World Bank Group, MIGA routinely provides an 
umbrella of deterrence against government actions that could disrupt insured investments” 
(www.miga.org).  
The preferred creditor status of the World Bank and other multilateral development 
institutions is not a legal status, but it is embodied in practice and has received consistent 
universal recognition. It is granted by member governments of the IFC and recognised by 
other creditors. It is also an important element in the IFC’s triple-A ratings. Because of the 
mitigation of transfer and convertibility risk, capital markets transactions structured under  
the IFC B-loan umbrella can achieve a rating above the sovereign rating of the host country. 
Through the IFC umbrella, the ceiling can be “pierced”.  
The preferred creditor status stems from the fact that defaulting on payments to the 
World Bank would probably result in a halt to disbursements of other Bank loans, and possibly 
a stop on the approval of new projects (Fitch ICBA, 2000). Developing-country governments 
are therefore far less likely to default on payments on a contract involving a major donor than 
they are on another contract. With a MIGA guarantee, furthermore, MIGA has the right, in the 
event of a payout, to recoup the cost from the host country government. 
Private project financiers depend on credit ratings by experts like Fitch and Moodys.  
Fitch will grant a higher credit rating to a project where there is a guarantee from an MDB. 
Furthermore, Fitch will grant a higher credit rating the more the country is dependent on  
the MDB that grants the guarantee. This is because the more dependent a government is on  
a particular donor, the less likely the risk of default on a loan from that MDB (Fitch ICBA, 2000). 
Thus, a higher level of donor dependence can result in a higher credit rating for project finance 
involving an MDB.  
The clout of the IFC also seems to affect negotiations with country governments. Gratwick 
and Eberhard (2008) compare two IPPs in Kenya, one with an IFC equity stake and one without. 
The one with the IFC involvement has not lowered tariffs and the presence of a multilateral 
development institution is cited as one of the reasons. The other IPP did lower tariffs in 
response to government pressure. The researchers also find that the power projects that  
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The backing of donors is important for other donor-sponsored project financiers. In an 
interview broadcast on CNBC, Orli Arav, the Director of EAIF, indicated that the organisation 
did not require political risk insurance, unlike other financiers, because the EAIF has the 
backing of European governments.11 
Thus, while there is an extensive array of risk mitigation mechanisms, it seems that  
what investors are really looking for—and what donor-sponsored facilities to promote PPI are 
offering—is a development institution partner that will put them above other private investors 
in the government payment pecking order and hence the risk is lower than for other investors. 
Presumably, if IFC-partnered investors receive preferential treatment then other private firms 
are relegated. Donors, therefore, are not merely providers of finance. They determine where 
and what investment will take place. Hence PSP under such terms is not exactly a market 
response to the external conditions but is entirely moulded by donor policy.  
Organisations like the IFC play a major role in determining what private investment takes 
place. To date, however, little investment has reached SSA. Despite priding itself on a focusing 
on frontier markets (“IFC goes where we are needed most, reaching the underserved wherever 
they are”), to date the SSA region has accounted for a relatively small proportion of activities—
just 10 per cent of the IFC's committed portfolio in 2008. The IFC is planning to scale-up its 
activities in SSA and in 2007 the SSA countries in which it operated increased from 17 to 25  
(IFC Annual Report, 2008).  
However, not only have few projects taken place in SSA but the performance of those 
projects has been weak. The weak environmental and social effects of projects in Africa, 
compared to projects in other regions, have been a feature since 2003. The poor performance 
of the IFC’s African projects stems in part from of lack of “client commitment”, while capacity  
to pursue sustainability has proven to be problematic, particularly when businesses 
underperform financially, and at times there have been “substantial imperfections in legal  
and regulatory frameworks and implementation” (IEG, 2008b: 8). IFC projects work best where 
market conditions are best, which suggests that PPI responds to rather than shapes market 
conditions. “Positive market conditions in most regions, with the notable exception of Africa, 
have contributed to better overall development performance” (IEG, 2008b: 11). 
The above discussion, then, shows that efforts to divert PSP into areas where it does not 
want to go have limited success. It is an uphill struggle akin to slotting a square peg into a 
round hole, and even the IFC finds it difficult to operate in these sectors and this region. Private 
investment in the water sector in Africa has all but dried up. PSP in electricity is only achieved 
when investments are tightly ring-fenced, and when government guarantees and donor clout 
ensure high returns for investors. Some funds have been raised from the private sector, but at 
considerable cost. 
5  CONCLUSION AND ALTERNATIVES 
Overall, despite the extensive efforts and resources devoted to promoting PSP in SSA, the 
results have been disappointing for those who might have hoped that such initiatives would 
bring investment on anything like the scale required to achieve the MDGs. It would appear, 
then, that in contrast to the IFC’s exuberance as noted above, water and sanitation in SSA is 
not a good business opportunity. The up-front costs are high, the payback time is lengthy, 
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The region is still a risky investment destination and weak infrastructure is a deterrent  
to private investment.  
This is not to deny that there have been some positive outcomes from the initiatives 
described. For example, InfraCo (part of the PIDG) is helping to develop a wind farm in  
Cape Verde and a Ghanaian-owned power project. There are some sound private operators 
delivering water and electricity in SSA. Water providers in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are 
regularly cited as success stories (although the extent to which their success is attributable  
to privatisation is not clear) and AES is now well established in the delivery of electricity in 
Cameroon. But the extent of PSP is small relative to infrastructure needs. Many PSP contracts in 
the water sector have failed (Chad, Guinea, Cape Verde, Mali) and others did not start, such as 
in Malawi and Benin. In the energy sector, although most countries have started the process  
of facilitating PPI by introducing legal reforms and more than a third have IPPs (IMF, 2008a), 
these are expensive because of poor technology choices, procurement problems and currency 
devaluation, and often they are subject to renegotiation (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). 
Despite its shortcomings, PSP remains the favoured policy option for donors in the  
water and electricity sectors. According to the World Bank’s 2004 Water Sector Strategy (which 
remains current), about 40 per cent of water projects financed by the Bank now involve some 
form of private sector participation (World Bank, 2004). In the course of the World Bank’s 
Sustainable Infrastructure Action Plan for 2009–2011, the World Bank Group (WPG)  
“will actively scale-up PPP programmes, using all parts of the WBG” (World Bank, 2008: 15).  
The slow private sector response has led supporters to step up efforts to encourage investors 
into the region.  
Private firms have been reluctant to commit to infrastructure projects in SSA unless they 
have no investment commitment or they are virtually guaranteed to make a substantial profit. 
Measures to accommodate investors mean that governments, and ultimately developing-
country taxpayers, face risks from the high costs of IPPs and from contractual arrangements  
to ring-fence profitable and secure aspects of delivery. In recent years, suiting the needs of 
investors rather than end-users has dominated sector policies as policymakers seek alternative 
ways to secure investment and PSP, yet investment is still not forthcoming. There seems  
to be a fundamental mismatch between the needs of private firms and those of users of  
water and electricity in SSA. 
While much of the focus is on reducing risk for investors, little attention is devoted to  
how these policies increase the risks for governments, taxpayers and end-users. The above 
discussion shows that there are costs associated with reducing sector policy to the creation  
of an attractive business environment. As a result of a focus on PSP, electricity and water prices 
are high, sectors are fragmented and governments are amassing future liabilities through 
expensive, long-term guarantees provided for private power projects.  
In the longer term, the private sector is unlikely to provide finance for infrastructure on a 
major scale and expectations that it might do so seem imprudent, given that this can only lead 
to future liabilities. Furthermore, there is little academic research to support the argument that 
private sector involvement leads to greater efficiency in SSA. Many of the conditions that the 
literature on PSP in industrialised countries sees as essential to success are waived in the case 
of SSA. For example, there is little competition, weak regulation and minimal transfer of risk.  Working Paper  33 
 
 
Infrastructure reforms are not always designed to solve perceived problems in the sectors 
but are often implemented to comply with conditions set by development agencies, MDBs  
or regional and global trade agreements (Jerome, 2004). Sector policies have had input from 
several donors reflecting different agendas, donors have promoted policies that are based on 
industrial frameworks, and strategies have ignored the importance of developing nationally 
grounded systems (Cook, 2006). Certainly, a review of World Bank projects in the region reveals 
remarkable homogeneity in the approach to challenges in these sectors despite the disparity 
of national circumstances. Where PPPs have not been achieved, the remedy is to work on the 
underlying conditions to support PPPs.  
The approach of donors and governments to privatisation has changed over the past  
two decades. The strategy no longer centres on transferring infrastructure assets to the private 
sector and the range of policy options is more flexible. Greater use of the domestic private 
sector can be beneficial but it needs to be regulated and managed as much as international 
operators. Donors remain wedded to a fundamental belief that the private sector is superior. 
An alternative approach would be to support and strengthen state provision and encourage 
public providers because, like it or not, they will continue to deliver these services. This would 
entail addressing specific issues in order to understand the details of poor service delivery at 
the country level and to offer appropriate responses and support. It may be that the water and 
electricity sectors in SSA develop along different lines from the industrialised-country model. 
Central to such an approach would be to look at what has worked in the region.  
Two public utilities in particular are regarded as successful: the National Water and 
Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) in Uganda and the Office National de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement 
(ONEA) in Burkina Faso. Both of these have worked with the private sector but remain in the 
public domain. ONEA was technically capable of managing the water supply system but was 
facing serious difficulties in its commercial, financial and accounting functions and did not 
have the resources to expand the water system to accommodate recent urban population 
increase. Donors recommended a long-term lease contract but the government rejected  
this in favour of a much smaller-scale service contract which has now ended. The government 
decided that ONEA should remain a publicly-owned limited liability company because of the 
strategic nature of water and the need to finance a large part of the investments from 
concessional resources (World Bank, 2008c). 
In its evaluation document on the ONEA project, the World Bank concluded that a lesson 
from the project in Burkina Faso is that the public-private argument is an artificial debate as 
the public sector can deliver results. The implication is that it does not matter if a utility is 
public or private. However, this is not the case. There are costs associated with PSP that  
rarely come into the debate. PSP raises risks for governments. There are difficulties attached  
to having a foreign private company running a water or electricity utility. There are competing 
objectives, and companies are responsible to shareholders rather than to local users. There are 
information asymmetries that need to be overcome through regulation; this is difficult enough 
in industrialised countries, let alone in a much weaker institutional context. There is a potential 
de-skilling of the state, which becomes a contract monitor rather than a service provider. There 
is a vulnerability that the private provider might withdraw in response to a change in corporate 
strategy from international headquarters.  
The Bank’s response to the failings of the PSP model of the 1990s is to adapt the model  
to take account of lessons and experience (Saghir, 2007)—for example, looking for a new type 34  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
of investor. But this is little more than tweaking the established privatisation framework.  
The lessons of experience show that efforts to promote PSP in SSA result in little investment, 
high prices, sector fragmentation and potential liabilities for governments with guarantees  
for investors. It is clearly very difficult, if not impossible, for governments and donors to create 
conditions that mitigate risks to an acceptable level for investors when the region has such a 
high risk profile. The costs of trying to create these conditions can be high. When there are 
other less risky investment destinations, firms will shy away from the region. Rather than 
adapting the failed PPP model, a radical rethink is required, one that puts delivery to the 
poorest at the centre. The efforts being made to bring in the private sector are potentially 
detracting from the development of long-term, cohesive, integrated government policies. 
Sectors need a coherent strategy rather than ad hoc attempts at privatisation.  
 





DONOR INITIATIVES RELATED TO PRIVATE SECTOR  
INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
Not all of the initiatives listed below provide specific support to PSP in infrastructure. Some are 
sources of information and some support the private sector generally rather than specifically 
investments in infrastructure. But in this complex area, which is full of sometimes confusing 
abbreviations, this is a brief guide to some of the organisations and operations involved. 
 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) 
www.infrastructureafrica.org 
This is a research project that aims to create a comprehensive infrastructure database on 
African infrastructure. The project is sponsored by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, the 
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and regional economic 
communities (such as the East African Community, the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union and the Southern African Development Community). The project covers 24 countries 
and all major economic infrastructure: energy, information and communication technologies, 
irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. 
 
Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund 
www.eib.org/projects/regions/acp/infrastructure_trust_fund 
In the context of the 2005 Gleneagles Declaration and the establishment of an EU Strategy for 
Africa, the European Union and African counterparts established a Partnership for African 
Infrastructure. The EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund is an innovative financial instrument 
launched in 2007 to support the implementation of the Partnership. The Trust Fund benefits 
cross-border and regional infrastructure projects in SSA. It channels grant resources from the 
European Commission and member states in such a way that they can be blended with the 
lending capacity of the European Investment Bank and member state development financiers. 
The target infrastructure sectors are energy, water, transport and telecommunications. 
 
Africa Progress Panel 
www.africaprogresspanel.org 
“The objective of the Africa Progress Panel is to focus world leaders’ attention on delivering on 
their commitments, particularly the good governance and economic support which is 
imperative for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.”  
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Business Action for Africa 
http://www.businessactionforafrica.org/ 
Business Action for Africa (BAA) was launched at the G8 summit in July 2005. Its aims are to 
positively influence policies needed for growth and poverty reduction; to promote a more 
balanced view of Africa; and to develop and showcase good business practice. The current 
sponsors and Oversight Group members of BAA are (according to BAA website on 15.9.08): 
Anglo American; British American Tobacco; De Beers; DFID; Joint International Unit of the 
DWP/DfES; Diageo; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office; IBLF; Merck & Co; Royal Dutch Shell; 




Full name: Infrastructure Development Collaboration Partnership Fund. 
Established: June 2003.  
Capital: US$ 15.7 million.  
Managed by: IFC. 
Funding: donors make an annual contribution. 
The aim is to provide technical assistance in support of PPI initiatives. No activity in the water 
or energy sectors in SSA. The main use of resources will be to fund the cost of specialised 
consultants associated with the design and implementation of private sector infrastructure 
transactions.  
DevCo is an untied multi-donor facility established by the IFC and the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) to support IFC's privatisation advisory work 
in infrastructure as part of its involvement with the Private Infrastructure Development Group 
(PIDG). The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Development Agency and Sweden's 
International Development Agency have also contributed funds to the facility.  
DevCo supports transactions in the poorest nations (DAC list columns I–III) to increase private 
sector involvement in the provision of infrastructure structure services. The additional funds 
help defray the costs of expert consultants who work with teams lead by the IFC's Advisory 
Services to prepare infrastructure projects for private sector investment. DevCo funds also help 
defray the IFC's project development costs associated with identifying projects for DevCo to 
support.  
 
Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund 
www.emergingafricafund.com 
An initiative of the PIDG.  
Established: 2001. 
Capital: $ 365 million. Working Paper  37 
 
 
The Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) is a public private partnership able to provide 
long-term US dollar-denominated or euro-denominated debt or mezzanine finance on 
commercial terms to finance the construction and development of private infrastructure in 45 
countries across SSA. EAIF can provide between US$ 10 million and US$ 36.5 million (or its 
equivalent in euros) to projects across a wide range of sectors including telecoms, transport, 
water and power, among others. EAIF offers US dollar and euro lending to private companies 
(or soon to be privatised companies) for greenfield projects or for the refurbishment, 




Full name: Global Partnership for Output Based Aid. 
Established: 2003. 
Established by: DFID and World Bank. 
Managed by: World Bank. 
The 2008 Annual Report records a portfolio of active projects of US$ 72 million. GPOBA 
provides grants for subsidy funding as well as technical assistance. Under OBA, a service is 
delegated to a third party under a contract that ties payment to the performance of outputs 
and delivery of results. The aim is to transfer performance risk to the private sector, thereby 
providing an incentive to deliver results. These are public subsidies supported by donor 
funding. In some cases, concessionaires bid for a project on the strength of the subsidy they 




Owned by the PIDG Trust and managed by Standard Infrastructure Fund Managers (Africa) 
Limited.  
As most infrastructure projects are paid in local currency, GuarantCo was conceived 
to support local currency financing for such projects and to more closely match the debt 
currency and terms with its payment. Thus the key criterion is that the guarantee should aid 
the availability of local currency.  
Guarantco cannot cover equity participations. It can only cover senior and subordinated  
or mezzanine debt. 
It can provide a variety of contingent products, including partial credit and partial risk 
guarantees, first loss guarantees, tenor extension or liquidity guarantees. It can also  
provide joint guarantees or counter guarantees as may be required for a particular project. 
GuarantCo can support projects in the following sectors: energy supply, including  
generation, transmission and distribution; water/waste services; transport; 
telecommunications; gas transportation, distribution and storage; urban infrastructure; 
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parties; other activities that positively affect the development of the relevant country’s  
basic infrastructure and promote the objectives of Guarantco. 
 
International Finance Corporation 
www.ifc.org 
The IFC provides an extensive array of products to private enterprises investing in developing 
countries including loans (A-loans), syndicated loans (B-loans), equity investment, quasi-equity 
investment (C-loans), structured finance, hedging products, local currency financing, 
subnational finance and advice. 
IFC was established with a special mandate to support and catalyse private sector 
development in developing countries. Its purpose is to further economic development by 
encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise in member countries (articles of 
agreement).  
It shall not undertake any financing for which in its opinion sufficient private capital could be 
obtained on reasonable terms (articles of agreement). IFC’s investments should, where 
possible, have a catalytic component. 
IFC has been expanding its business rapidly—the volume of new investment operations has 





Funded by: PIDG donors—Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom  
and the World Bank.  
Aims to stimulate greater private investment in African and Asian infrastructure  
development by acting as a principal project developer, focusing on lower income countries. 
InfraCo funds early-stage, high-risk costs by taking an equity stake in the project and making 
decisions that will lead to a socially responsible and successful construction and operation.  
 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) 
www.icafrica.org  
Established: 2005 after Gleneagles. 
Members: Africa—African Development Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa.  
G8 Bilateral agencies—Canada, United Kingdom, France, United States, Germany,  
Japan, Russia, Italy. Multilaterals—World Bank Group, European Commission,  
European Investment Bank. 
Aim: the Consortium addresses national and regional constraints on infrastructure 
development by sharing information, project development and good practice.  Working Paper  39 
 
 
The ICA is not a financing agency but it acts as a platform to catalyse donor  
and private sector financing of infrastructure projects and programmes in Africa. 
 
InfraVentures 
IFC fund of $ 100 million to provide risk capital for the early stages of development for 
infrastructure projects. Launched in August 2008.  
 
Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF) 
www.investmentclimatefacility.org 
The ICF is a new vehicle for improving investment conditions in Africa. The ICF has set a target 
of $ 110 million for its first three-year phase, most of which was raised before the launch of the 
ICF. While being fully operational and funding expenditure from the capital raised so far, the 
ICF is seeking additional funds from development agencies and corporate investors to increase 
the scope and scale of its impact.  
The donor community will provide most of the ICF’s funds. Its donor investors include  
DFID, the governments of Ireland and the Netherlands, the European Commission and the IFC. 
The ICF's corporate investors include Anglo America plc, Celtel, Microsoft, Royal Dutch Shell plc 




Full Name: Nepad Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility. 
Established: 2003, with seed funding from Canada. 
The key objective of the NEPAD-IPPF is to assist African countries, regional economic 
communities and related infrastructure development institutions to prepare high-quality, 
viable regional infrastructure projects in energy, trans-boundary water resource management, 
transport and ICTs, which would be ready to solicit financing from public and private sources in 
support of the objectives of NEPAD. 
 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
www.miga.org 
As a member of the World Bank Group, MIGA routinely provides firms with guarantees against 
government actions that could disrupt insured investments, and helps resolve potential 
disputes to the satisfaction of all parties. It offers four types of guarantee coverage: transfer 
restriction; expropriation; war and civil disturbance; and breach of contract. It also offers 
dispute resolution service. 
If the parties are unable to settle their dispute and a claim for compensation is brought by an 
investor under a MIGA guarantee, the Agency will review the facts of the dispute and make a 
formal determination. If MIGA finds for the insured investor, it will pay the compensation to 40  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
which the investor is entitled under the guarantee. Under the terms of the international 
convention establishing MIGA, the Agency is then permitted to seek reimbursement of such 




The Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) is a multi-donor organisation established 
in 2002. Its objective is to encourage private infrastructure investment in developing countries 
that contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction. The PIDG has established a range 
of facilities and investment vehicles providing varying types of financial, practical and strategic 
support in order to realise this objective.  
Current members include DFID, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Agency,  
the World Bank, the Austrian Development Agency and Irish Aid. 
As PIDG is not a legal entity in its own right, it has established a trust (the PIDG Trust) to 
perform many of its functions. The PIDG Trust is located in Mauritius but is managed by a 




IFC Private Enterprise Partnership for Africa is the primary vehicle for delivering IFC advisory 
services in Africa. Established in 2005, IFC PEP Africa works in partnership with multilateral 
agencies, governments and the private sector to deliver programmes and advisory services 
that improve the investment climate, mobilise private sector investment, and enhance the 
competitiveness of private enterprises in Africa. 
 
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
www.ppiaf.org 
PPIAF was launched in 1999 as a joint initiative of the governments of Japan and the  
United Kingdom, working closely with the World Bank. It was built on the World Bank Group's 
Infrastructure Action Program and designed to reinforce the actions of all participating donors. 
PPIAF’s members include bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international 
financial institutions. Owned and directed by its participating donors, PPIAF is managed  
by the World Bank through a Program Management Unit.  
It is funded by donors: the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the European 
Commission, and the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
PPIAF assists developing country governments and other public bodies to improve  
the policies, laws, regulations and institutions that allow them to better harness private 
participation in infrastructure where they wish to do so. PPIAF helps developing countries Working Paper  41 
 
 
improve their infrastructure through specific technical assistance. It also identifies, 
disseminates and shares best practices in the filed of public-private partnerships in 
infrastructure in developing countries. 
 
Technical Assistance Facility 
The overall objective of the Technical Assistance Facility (TAF), which is part of the PIDG,is to 
enhance the ability of public and private sector clients to attract private capital to the financing 
of infrastructure and related services. 
TAF achieves this by helping PIDG clients to evaluate, develop and/or implement risk 
mitigation, financial and regulatory mechanisms, standards, systems and procedures essential 
to raising funds in the capital markets. This will enable developing countries to make a strong 




Affermage contracts: see Leases. 
 
BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer): a type of contract under which ownership of the infrastructure 
during the contract period belongs to the private consortium. Afterwards the infrastructure 
either reverts to the public sector (for example, hospitals, schools and so on) or remain  
with the private sector if there is no clear long-term public sector need. 
 
Concession contracts: contractual arrangement that grants rights to a firm to operate a 
defined infrastructure services and to receive revenues from it. The concessionaire is 
remunerated directly by tariffs and is in charge of operations and investments The firm pays a 
fee to the concession-granting authority. The assets remain the property of the government. 
Private companies are given a licence to run the water system and charge customers to make a 
profit. The private company is responsible for all investments, including building new pipes 
and sewers to connect households that are not yet connected. This does not have to be  
from the company's own share capital but can be raised from loans and grants. Concession 
contracts may set out targets to be met by the company—for example, to invest a particular 
amount in the first five years. Concessions typically last 20–30 years (Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
 
Due diligence: the process of investigation and evaluation, performed by investors, into the 
details of a potential investment, such as an examination of operations and management and 
the verification of material facts. 
 
Lease contract: the company is responsible for running the distribution system and for 
making the investments necessary to repair and renew the existing assets, but the public 
authority remains responsible for new investment. The private company is not responsible for 
the investment in extensions to connect households that were previously unconnected. These 
contracts are also known by their French name, affermage contracts (Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
 
Management contract: the private company is responsible for managing the (water) service 
but not for making any of the investment or even, usually, employing the workforce. A typical 
management contract involves a few senior managers from the private company being 
assigned to run the water company for a period of between one and five years. These contracts 
are risk-free for the private sector and do not involve any investment by the private company 
(Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
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Mezzanine debt: debt that incorporates equity-based options (for example, warrants) with 
lower-priority debt. It is more like equity than debt in that the debt is usually only important in 
the event of bankruptcy. It is often used to finance acquisitions and buyouts.  
 
Non-recourse debt: debt contracted by the project without recourse to the sponsors  
of the project. 
 
On-demand guarantee: in its pure sense, a demand or on-demand guarantee may be called 
by the beneficiary by making a demand on the guarantor and without any proof of default by 
the borrower. In contrast, a conditional guarantee requires further conditions to be met before 
payment by the guarantor, which could include obtaining full and final judgment of default, 
acceleration or realisation of the security.  
 
Partial risk guarantee: a partial risk guarantee can cover the occurrence of certain specified 
risks, such as completion risk, liquidity risk and others. 
 
Political risk guarantees: this is a specific type of partial risk guarantee that, as its  
name suggests, covers certain political risk events. Such risks typically include currency 
inconvertibility, currency transfer restrictions, war and civil disturbance, and expropriation. 
  
Political risk insurance: this covers losses caused by specific political risk events, including 
traditional political risks for equity investors and debt providers. It includes currency 
inconvertibility and transfer restriction—this insurance or guarantee covers losses arising from 
an inability to convert local currency into foreign exchange or to transfer funds outside the 
country; expropriation—losses from acts by the host government that may reduce or eliminate 
ownership of, control over, or rights to the insured investment; war and civil disturbance—
losses from damage to, or the destruction or disappearance of, tangible assets caused by 
politically motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the host country. It might cover breach 
of contract by the host government and arbitration-award default when a government fails to 
pay an award made by an arbitral or judicial forum. 
 
Public private partnerships: this is an agreement between the government and one or more 
private partners whereby the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the 
service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the 
private partners, and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer 
of risk to the private partners (OECD, 2008a: 132). 
 
Senior debt: a class of corporate debt that has priority with respect to interest and  
principal over other classes of debt and over all classes of equity by the same issuer.  
It has priority in a liquidation. 
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Special purpose vehicle: a consortium of financial institutions and private companies 
responsible for all the activities of a PPP. 
 
Subordinated debt: debt that is either unsecured or has a lower priority than other claims. 
 
Take-or-pay clause: an arrangement whereby customers agree to buy a certain quantity over a 
period of time, often at a predetermined price. If the customers do not buy as contracted, they 
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ICB    International competitive bid 
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IDA    International Development Association 
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PSP    Private sector participation  
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